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Labor Law-1963 Tennessee Survey
Paul H. Sanders* and Harvey Couch**
I. AwTRATioN PROCESS
II. PICETN G
Ifl. SECONDARY BoycoTrs
IV. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
V. l IG S OF EMPLOYEES

I. ARBITRATION PROCESS
An active area of litigation today is concerned with the interrelation
of the judicial process and the arbitration process in the settlement of
labor disputes. It was observed in last year's survey that the Supreme
Court of the United States had "embarked on the project of fashioning
a body of federal common law governing the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements"' since the landmark decision in the
Lincoln Mills case.2 A substantial and integral part of this "federal
common law" (which covers all matters within the scope of section
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act) deals with the arbitration process-the
rights and duties of the parties, and the place of the courts vis-a-vis
the arbitrator. Here the Supreme Court, perhaps most notably in the
1960 Steelworkers trilogy3 and in the 1962 Sinclair trilogy, 4 has been
developing guidelines for the lower federal courts, and the state
courts in both of which section 301 suits may be brought. Important
annew decisions interpreting rights under section 301 have been
5
nounced by the Supreme Court within the last few months.
During the past year, in cases originating from Tennessee, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was confronted
with some of the problems posed in this rapidly developing area of
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
00 Member, Arkansas Bar.

1. Sanders, Labor Law-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REv. 792 (1963).
2. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), 16 V.ND. L. REv.
1252 (1963).
3. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
4. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Drake Bakeries v. American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254
(1962). As might be expected, these two sets of cases have engendered much
comment. Articles discussing them are collected in Jones & Smith, Management and
Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments,
62 MicE. L. REV. 1115 n.3, 1116 n.4 (1964); 16 VAND. L. REV. 245 (1963).
5. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335 (1964); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 375 U.S. 928 (1964); Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964).
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law. Perhaps the most important case, in this respect, was Jefferson

City Cabinet Co. v. International Union of Electrical Workers.; In
this case an employee, who had been absent on authorized sick leave,

returned to work and was told there was no work that day but there
would be the following day. A large number of employees walked

out that afternoon, and the plant was closed down the following day.
The employer then filed suit under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)7 for damages, alleging violation of a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement. The
court posed the issue in one paragraph:
Thus, there is no denial by the parties that there was a strike, which was in
violation of the no-strike provision of the bargaining agreement. The issue
presented is, Can an action to recover damages for this breach of the
bargaining agreement be maintained in the District Court or is it a matter
which is required by the bargaining agreement to be submtted to arbitration?8

It was then noted that it is for the court to decide whether an issue
is arbitrable in a mandatory sense under the agreement. 9

The court of appeals first had to face three of its earlier decisions
in which it had held that the suit for damages for breach could be
maintained in court, the breach of a no-strike clause not being an
arbitrable issue. 10 The court explains these holdings on two grounds:
[W]e took the position that the no-strike clause was an independent, unequivocal, unconditional obligation on the part of the union: that arbitration
of any 'difference' or 'grievance' that might arise was to be used instead of
a strike; that there was no right to strike under any conditions; and, accordingly, the right to strike was not an arbitrable issue under the contract. This
interpretation of the bargaining agreement is what has been referred to by
the Supreme Court in later cases as the 'quid pro quo' theory in a bargaining agreement, namely, that the unconditional no-strike obligation on the
part of the union is the consideration given to the employer in exchange
for his promise to arbitrate disputes or grievances. Being such, it is not
subject to any exceptions, it is not arbitrable.1 1

The court says that if this rationale were still in effect it might control
the instant case. But, as the court points out, this rationale was
6. 313 F.2d 231 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 936 (1963).
7. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
8. 313 F.2d at 232.
9. 313 F.2d at 233, citing Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 4; Drake Bakeries
v. American Bakery Workers, supra note 4; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., supra note 3; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 3.
10. Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 289 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1961);
UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1957); Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954). "The Court
held in each case that a breach of the no-strike provision of the bargaining agreement
was not a 'grievance' within the scope of the grievance procedure." 313 F.2d at 234.
11. 313 F.2d at 234.
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subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court in the Drake Bakeries
case. 12 Thus a no-strike clause is not, just because of its nature, taken
out of the scope of arbitrable issues. There was another ground upon
which the Sixth Circuit had rested its decision in the earlier cases. In
each of them, the arbitration clauses involved were narrowly drawn;
in fact, in two of the cases only employees could file a grievance and
invoke arbitration. 3 Although the 'quid pro quo' theory has, in effect,
been rejected, this other ground delineates a factor which still must
be considered: that is, is the breach of a no-strike clause an issue that
must be arbitrated under the provisions of this particular bargaining
agreement? In the instant case, the court held that it was, and that
the employer must submit his claim for damages to arbitration. In
reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out that the contract
referred to arbitration of disputes as well as grievances. The contract
also provided: "A claim that the Company or the Union has violated
some provision of this contract or failed to perform some obligation
assumed under this contract is an arbitrable grievance within the
meaning of this contract."' 4 (Emphasis added.) The court considered
this language crucial in determining that, under this contract, the
breach of a no-strike clause was a matter for arbitration.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided another case
growing out of the same labor dispute. 15 The employer discharged a
large number of the strikers, whereupon the union filed a grievance
and requested their reinstatement. The employer refused to arbitrate.
The district court granted summary judgment directing arbitration
and the court of appeals affirmed.
It was the employer's contention that (a) the union's violating the
contract by striking had in effect repudiated it, and this relieved the
employer of performing his part, and (b) the union had filed its
grievance too late and therefore had not complied with the procedural
requirements set forth in the collective agreement. The court quickly
disposed of the first contention, citing a number of Supreme Court
cases which have held that a collective bargaining agreement establishes a "generalized code" and is not to be judged necessarily by
ordinary contract law. 6 As for the second contention, the court held
12. Drake Bakeries v. American Bakery Workers, supra note 4, at 261.
13. Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, supra note 10; UAW v. Benton
Harbor Malleable Indus., supra note 10. On this factual difference these earlier
holdings probably remain valid. See Drake Bakeries v. American Bakery Workers,
supra note 4, at 264, n.13; Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
299 F.2d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1962).
14. 313 F.2d at 236 (Emphasis added by the court.)
15. International Union of Elec. Workers v. Jefferson City Cabinet Co., 314 F.2d
192 (6th Cir. 1963).
16. Drake Bakeries v. American Bakery Workers, supra note 4, at 261-63; United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra note 3, at 567; United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 3, at 578-79.
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that whether there has been sufficient compliance with grievance17
procedures is a question to be determined initially by the arbitrator.
Another dispute which similarly caused two cases to reach the
Sixth Circuit arose out of the merger of the Louisville and Nashville
and the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis railroads. In approving
the merger, the Interstate Commerce Commission imposed certain
conditions for the protection of employees of the two railroads who
might be adversely affected by the merger. The ICC order provided
that disputes concerning the afforded protection may be referred, by
either party, to an arbitration committee. The order left to the carrier
and the employees' representative the formation, procedures, and
duties of such committee. Subsequently, the railroad and the union
entered an agreement adopting the ICC order and implementing it
with respect to the arbitration process.
Certain employees, who claimed they were discharged as a result
of the merger, brought suits against the railroad for benefits allegedly
due to them under the conditions imposed by the ICC. The district
court held that the employees must submit to arbitration and dismissed the action.' 8 Thereupon the railroad filed a complaint seeking
a declaratory judgment in order to resolve a dispute as to the proper
method of arbitration. The railroad contended it should be in compliance with the agreement between the railroad and the union. The
employees, still contending that they were proceeding under the ICC
order, argued that they could each negotiate with the railroad as to
the establishment of a machinery for arbitration. The district court
rejected this contention, and held that arbitration must be in accordance with provisions of the agreement between the railroad and the
union.' 9

These two cases were consolidated on appeal before the Sixth
Circuit, which affirmed both judgments.20 The court held that the
phrase "may be referred [to arbitration]" that appears in the ICC
order was mandatory, not permissive, and thereafter the agreement
between the railroad and the union provided the procedure for carrying this out. The court held that this agreement then became binding
upon the parties, and that this in no way prejudiced the rights of the
employees.
II. PICKETING

The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
17. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon Livingston v. John
Wiley & Sons, 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963). That case has since been affirmed by
the Supreme Court. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, supra note 5.
18. Arnold v. Louisville & N.R.R., 180 F. Supp. 429 (M.D. Tenn. 1960).
19. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Cantrell, 215 F. Supp. 229 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
20. Batts v. Louisville & N.R.R., 316 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1963).
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amended section 8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act to make
it an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in picketing which
has as an object the forcing of an employer to recognize the union
as the representative of the employees, provided, among other conditions, the union has not filed a petition for certification within a
22
reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days.21 Section 10 of the Act
was amended to provide that the NLRB regional attorney could seek
injunctive relief pending final adjudication by the Board of a charge
that a union had engaged in recognition picketing, if there is reasonable cause to believe the charge was true.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee had occasion to construe the foregoing statutory sections in
Phillips v. UMW.23 It is not necessary to go into the somewhat complicated background facts which are fully set out in the district court
opinion. Suffice it to say that picketing began and thereafter the
employer filed charges alleging that the unions had engaged in an
unfair labor practice by conducting organizational and recognition
picketing in violation of section 8 (b) (7). Pending final disposition
of these charges by the Board, the regional attorney petitioned the
district court for a temporary injunction. The union contended that
recognition was not an object of the picketing, and furthermore, a
petition for certification had been filed with the Board within a
reasonable time. The court dismissed the first contention noting that
under section 10, which authorizes injunctive relief, it is only necessary that there be reasonable cause to believe that there has been an
unfair labor practice. The court held that upon the evidence, without judging the merits of the employer's charges, there was at least
reasonable cause to believe that recognition was an object of the
picketing.
A more problematical question was whether the union had filed a
petition for certification within a reasonable time (not to exceed
thirty days) from commencement of the picketing. A petition was
pending before the Board when picketing began on December 26,
1962. This petition was withdrawn by the union without prejudice
on January 29, 1963. Subsequently, a new petition was filed on
February 25, 1963. The question, as posed by the court, was whether
the petition which was pending when picketing began operated to
toll the thirty day limitation until the petition was withdrawn January
29. If so, the petition filed February 25 was timely, being filed within
thirty days of January 29. The court, however, said that the
pendency of a petition which is later withdrawn cannot effectively toll
21. 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (7) (c) (Supp. I, 1959).
22. 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. I, 1959).
23. 217 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
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the limitation. The court held that "a certification petition upon which
an election can be ordered by the Board must be filed within the thirty
day period and must remain filed until acted upon by the Board in
order to permit the continuance of recognition picketing." 24 The court
therefore issued a temporary injunction restraining the union from
engaging in recognition picketing.
Subsequent to the issuance of the injunction the union filed a
charge with the Board against the company alleging violation of
section 8(a) (1) and (2) of the Act. 25 Upon investigation, the Board

found reasonable cause for the issuance of a complaint, which complaint would have issued had not the employer signed an informal
settlement agreement. Upon this state of facts, a consent order
approved by the Board and the unions was tendered to the court
proposing to dissolve the previously issued temporary restraining
order. The employer filed a petition to intervene opposing the dissolution of the injunction and seeking to institute contempt proceedings for violation of the injunction. The court denied the petition
to intervene and held the employer had no standing to enforce the
injunction by contempt.
Section 10, which authorizes the regional attorney to seek injunctive relief, provides that there shall be no application for an
injunction if a charge has been filed against the employer under
section 8(a) (2) and there is reasonable cause to believe the charge
is true and that a complaint will issue. The Board contended that
this would require that the injunction be dissolved. The court observed that the proviso in section 10 does not literally apply to a
situation where an injunction has already been granted, but held
that such a strict interpretation would defeat the obvious intent of
Congress. The court construed the section to prevent the Board
from seeking or maintaining an injunction when a meritorious charge
under section 8(a) (2) appears to exist against the employer. The
court thereupon entered the consent order, thereby dissolving the
injunction.26
The Tennessee Supreme Court, during the past year, reiterated the
proposition that state courts continue to have jurisdiction to prohibit
future acts of violence connected with picketing, despite the doctrine
of federal preemption which is applicable to much of labor relations
law.2 7 In this case, upon the expiration of a bargaining agreement,
24. 217 F. Supp. at 558.

25. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1), (2) (1958).
26. Phillips v.UMW,218 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.Tenn. 1963).

27. Kingsport Press, Inc. v. International Printing Pressmen, 372 S.W.2d 289
(Tenn. 1963).
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many unfruitful bargaining sessions ensued which resulted in the
union calling a strike. A large number of pickets allegedly blocked
access to the plant and threatened those attempting to enter. The
company went into state court and sought a temporary injunction
against further acts of violence. The union contended that exclusive
jurisdiction over this cause rested in the National Labor Relations
Board. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's grant
of an injunction, holding that a state could enjoin future acts of
violence, intimidation, and threats of violence; that this is within the
traditional police power of the state, and not preempted by the
NLRB.2 s The court noted that the injunction was directed to acts of
violence, and was not "a blanket injunction against all picketing
29
peaceful or otherwise."
III. SECONDARY

BoycoTTs

Recently a large number of cases, many dealing with so-called
secondary boycotts, have grown out of the labor strife and economic
unrest existing in the coal mining region of eastern Tennessee. 30 The
past survey year has presented its share of such cases.
The archetypical secondary boycott is the situation where a union
striking against the primary employer, also brings pressure upon
("boycotts") a secondary employer (as by inducing his employees to
strike) with the objective of forcing the secondary employer to cease
doing business with the primary employer. Of course, the usual
situation normally does not fall within such simple, classical lines;
therefore, the courts must decide whether a given case does or does
not come within the specific restrictive language of the statute.
Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act' makes it
an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in the secondary boycott
activity therein described. Section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act32
declares the identical activity unlawful and permits anyone injured
thereby to sue for damages in the district court.
An extremely close and difficult case in this area was Gibbs v.
28. The court relied upon Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
29. 372 S.W.2d at 292. In the Youngdahl case, supra note 28, the Arkansas state
court issued a sweeping injunction against all picketing. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed to the extent that the injunction prohibited threatened violence and
obstruction, but set it aside to the extent that it enjoined peaceful picketing.
30. E.g., Sunfire Coal Co. v. UMW, 313 F.2d 108 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 924 (1963); Flame Coal Co. v. UMW, 303 F.2d 39 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371

U.S. 891 (1962); Gilchrist v. UMW, 290 F.2d 36 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
875 (1961); UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 881 (1960).
31. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1958).
32. 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958).
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UMW. 33 The Grundy Mining Company planned to open new mines,
pursuant to which they hired the plaintiff Gibbs as mine superintendent. At the same time, Gibbs was given the trucking contract
to haul the coal from the mines. Grundy opened a mine without a
union contract and on the same day picketing began, followed by
violence and threats of violence. Efforts to open the mine finally
ceased. Gibbs received one pay check for what amounted to a
half-a-month's salary, and, apparently, never did any hauling under
the trucking contract. Gibbs then filed suit against the union to
recover compensatory and punitive damages, alleging the union had
violated section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act and was also guilty of
a common law conspiracy. 34 His theory was that the union had
directed its activities toward Grundy to cause it to cease doing
business with Gibbs, both with respect to his employment contract
and his trucking contract. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff,
awarding 60,000 dollars compensatory damages for termination of
the employment contract, 14,500 dollars for termination of the trucking contract, and 100,000 dollars in punitive damages.
The defendant union moved for a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial
on a number of grounds. The most troublesome of these, for the
court, rested on the fact that much of the union activity occurred
on the premises of Grundy Mining Company. Gibbs' suit was predicated on the theory that he was injured by secondary activity directed
toward Grundy. The union contended that, if anything, there was
primary activity directed toward Grundy, as shown by the fact that
the union activity was on the premises of Grundy. Therefore, says
the union, there could be no unlawful secondary boycott. In support
5
of this, the union relied on the General Electric "reserved gate" case
33. 220 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
34. It will be noted that under the federal statute a plaintiff can recover only for
damages sustained. 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1958). Therefore,
to recover punitive damages the plaintiff must sue under state law. This claim
is usually joined with the federal action, a point which will be discussed later in
the text.
35. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961). That
case involved a General Electric plant which had five gates, one of which was posted
for the exclusive use of employees of independent contractors working within the
General Electric plant. The National Labor Relations Board held that peaceful
picketing which included the "reserved gate" constituted a secondary boycott in
violation of section 8(b) (4) (A). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
enforced the Board's order. The Supreme Court, after reviewing primary situs and
common situs cases, approved the separate gate rationale-that is, picketing will
violate section 8(b) (4) (A) if it occurs, though at the primary situs, at a gate for
employees of secondary employers if the gate is clearly marked and set apart from
other gates, and if the employees who use it do work unrelated to the normal
operations of the primary employer. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the
Board and the court of appeals because the record was not clear as to whether or
not some of the employees of independent contractors who used the "reserved gate"
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which it said stands for the proposition that picketing at the situs of
the primary employer cannot violate the secondary boycott provisions
of section 8(b) (4) (A). The district court went to some lengths to
distinguish the General Electric case, partly on the basis of the scope
of the review of a jury verdict vis-a-vis the Labor Board. The court
noted that all the union activity occurred on the premises of General
Electric, while in the instant case the activity occurred at various
places at various times. Finally, the court pointed out that in the
Supreme Court case there was no question but that General Electric
was the object of the primary activity, "whereas whether Grundy was
the object of primary or secondary activity or both is one of the
disputed issues in the principal case." 6 The jury, by holding for Gibbs
on this issue, found that Grundy was the object of secondary activity,
at least in respect to inducing Grundy to cease doing business with
Gibbs. This, according to the court, is not irreconcilable with the fact
that the activity occurred on Grundy's premises. The court said:
"While the situs of the union activity would be evidence which the
jury might properly consider in determining the object of such
activity, where the object is at issue, the situs is not itself controlling
in establishing a secondary boycott." 7
The union also claimed that there could be no action for damages
under section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act as the object of the activity
was to further claimed job rights with Grundy, and not to induce
Grundy to cease doing business with Gibbs. Contrary to this contention, the court held that there was testimony to support the jury's
verdict that this was "an object" of the union activity. "The fact that
the union may have had some object or objects other than and in
addition to causing Grundy to cease doing business with Gibbs could
not prevent the activity from constituting a secondary boycott insofar
as Gibbs was concerned, and therefore actionable by him as such."38
Finally, the union contended that the activity here involved could
not constitute an actionable secondary boycott as to Gibbs, since he,
as mine superintendent for Grundy, was not an "other person" within
the meaning of section 8(b) (4) (A). The court agreed, holding that
did conventional maintenance work of the same type performed at times by General
Electric's own employees. 366 U.S. at 682.
The negative conclusion to be drawn from the case is that, absent such a completely distinct entrance, peaceful picketing otherwise permissible at the primary
situs will not constitute forbidden secondary pressure.
36. 220 F. Supp. at 875-76.
37. 220 F. Supp. at 876. Thus the situs was evidence tending to show that Grundy
was the primary, and not the secondary-object- but -this evidence was not -controlling.
There is a good discussion of some of the problems involved in this case in Carrier
Corp. v. NLRB, 311 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1962), reversed sub nom., United Steelworkers
v. NLRB, 84 Sup. Ct. 899 (1964).
38. 220 F. Supp. at 877.
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it is clear from the section that "employees and supervisors of any
struck or picketed primary employer who may lose their employment
are not within the meaning of 'other person' and would have no
statutory action for any loss so occasioned." 39 By bringing Gibbs
within this holding, the court treats Grundy as a primary employer.
Yet on the first two questions we discussed above, the court, in upholding the jury's verdict, found that Grundy was the secondary object
of union activity. The court reconciles this saying: "Although, as
found by the jury, an object of the picketing of Grundy was to cause
it to cease employment of Gibbs, and Grundy may have been 'neutral'
or secondary to the dispute between UMW and Gibbs, there also
clearly existed a primary dispute between UMW and Grundy."40
Though Gibbs could not maintain his federal statutory action for loss
of his employment contract, the court held that there was evidence to
sustain the jury's verdict on his state common law conspiracy count
on this cause of action. Furthermore, although Gibbs was not an
"other person" with respect to his employment contract, he was an
"eother person" with respect to his trucking contract and therefore
could maintain his statutory action on this question.
The court, in reviewing the jury's award, held that there was no
evidence of damages incurred by loss of the trucking contract, and
the union's motion for a directed verdict should have been sustained
on this issue. The court also held that the jury's verdict with respect
to loss of the employment contract was excessive to the extent of
30,000 dollars, and the award of punitive damages was excessive to
the extent of 55,000 dollars. The court said that unless plaintiff
agreed to appropriate remittiturs, a new trial would be ordered.
Another secondary boycott case from the coal mining area went
before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 41 Here the plaintiff coal
mining company sued for damages under the federal statute and
under the state law prohibiting unlawful interference with business.
The court of appeals affirmed a judgment for plaintiff based on a
jury verdict. The evidence showed that truck drivers working for the
company which transported plaintiff's coal were shot at and otherwise
threatened and intimidated. The court held that this constituted a
secondary boycott in violation of section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The union argued that Congress, by providing this remedy for
secondary boycott activity, preempted this field, thus precluding
recovery of punitive damages under state law. The court said: "The
District Court had jurisdiction to entertain a claim for damages
39. Id. at 878.
40. Id. at 878.
41. White Oak Coal Co. v. UMW, 318 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. dcntled, 375
U.S. 966 (1964).
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under the federal statutes even though such claim was joined with
a non-federal action for unlawful interference with business."4 The
court cited one of its earlier decisions in which this point was discussed more fully.43 There, in a similar case, the court pointed out
that the same evidence supports the claim under federal law as
supports the claim under state law. There are not two separate
causes of action, but rather two grounds supporting a single cause
of action. In such a case, the federal court may retain jurisdiction
and pass upon the non-federal ground, under the rationale of Hum
v. Oursler.4
In Allen v. UM/1W,45 the Sixth Circuit was presented with a similar
case involving many of the same issues as the one just discussed. The
court affirmed the jury's verdict for plaintiff, largely on the basis of
the foregoing case.
Finally, the court of appeals faced its last secondary boycott case
of the survey year in Walters v. InternationalAssociation of Plumbers.46 Plaintiff was a small non-union contractor engaged in the
installation and repair of air conditioning systems. He agreed to
install such a system in a building being constructed by Red Food
Stores. The local union picketed the construction site. Red Food
Stores removed plaintiff from the job and did not give him any work
subsequently. Plaintiff recovered damages against the local and the
international union for engaging in an unlawful secondary boycott. In
a brief per curiam opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment
as to the local, but held that there was no evidence that the international participated and dismissed the complaint as to it.

IV.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Under Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 47 the findings of fact made
by the National Labor Relations Board are to be affirmed by the
reviewing court if they are supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole. This record includes the credibility
findings of the Board's Trial Examiner, for unlike the Board and
the reviewing court which have only the printed record, the examiner
hears witness and sees their demeanor while testifying. For this
reason, the Court in Universal Camera stated the examiner's credibility findings are entitled to great weight. However, the Court
said that these findings are not entitled to any more weight than they
42. 318 F.2d at 605-06.
43. UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., supra note 30.

44. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
45. 319 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1963).
46. 323 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1963).

47. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).

1102

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

deserve in light of reason and judicial experience. Needless to say,
these credibility48findings can on occasion prove troublesome to the
reviewing court.
An interesting case concerning credibility arose during the past
year.49 The trouble began on a busy Saturday afternoon at a large
grocery store in Memphis. According to employer testimony a union
agent was in the store trying to foment a work stoppage by employees; the store discharged one employee for inattention to his
work and another employee began repeatedly shouting that the
company "couldn't discharge the boy merely because he was a union
member." The second employee was discharged and no claim was
made with respect to these two employees. Subsequently, two other
employees left the store and later began picketing with homemade
placards. Company testimony was to the effect that one of these
employees had told the store manager that he was quitting. The
two employees testified that they left the store after they had been
fired. Sometime later the store denied their requested reinstatement,
and the union filed charges with the Board alleging that these two
employees had been discriminatorily discharged.
The employees said that they had been discharged on that Saturday
afternoon, but said that they had not gone outside to engage in a
strike. The trial examiner did not credit their statements, in either
respect, as he found that they were not discharged, but that they
had engaged in a union-sponsored strike. Since this was a protected
activity they were entitled to reinstatement. These findings were
adopted by the Board.
The court of appeals, on a petition to set aside the order affirmed
the finding that they were not discharged, as this was supported by
substantial evidence. But the court held that the examiner's finding
that the employees had left the store to engage in a strike was not
supported by substantial evidence, pointing out that the only direct
evidence on this was the employees' denial that they left for this
purpose. Accordingly, the Board's cross-petition for enforcement
of its order was denied.
In two other Board cases originating in Tennessee, the Sixth
Circuit denied enforcement in one and granted enforcement in the
other. In NLRB v. Southern Electronics Co.,50 the Board had found
that the company had violated section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the
Act5 ' by "refusing to reinstate five employees because of their union
48.
49.
50.
51.

See NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421, 425-26 (6th Cir. 1964).
Dunn Bros., Inc., v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1963).
312 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1963).
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (4) (1958).
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adherence and because they bad given testimony at a Board hear-

ing."5 2 In a brief order the court denied enforcement, holding that

the findings and order of the Board were not supported by substantial
evidence.
In NLRB v. Oman Construction Co.,53 an employee had been laid
off and refused re-employment. The Board, adopting the findings
of the examiner, held that the employee's layoff and refusal of reemployment was because of his union activities; thus it was discriminatory and in violation of section 8(a) (3) and (1). The court,
in a brief per curiam opinion, held that substantial evidence supported
the findings, and decreed enforcement of the Board's order.
The Tennessee Supreme Court had occasion to pass upon the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board in Caton v. PicWalsh Freight Co. 4 The plaintiffs in this case were truck drivers
employed by the defendant company and were members of the
defendant Teamsters Union. In 1960 they were transferred from
Memphis to St. Louis; although continuing to drive over the same
routes between the two cities, they lived and reported for work in
St. Louis. The collective bargaining agreement had a system of
terminal seniority; that is, seniority was based on time employed at
the terminal, rather than on total time employed by the company.
Seniority determined who would make the available runs. Plaintiffs,
being low men on the seniority roster at the St. Louis terminal, took
a cut in the number of runs and income. Plaintiffs filed a grievance
with the union which then approved the transfer. They then filed
charges with the NLRB, but these were subsequently withdrawn.
Plaintiffs then filed this lawsuit for damages, alleging that the transfer
was an unlawful conspiracy between the company and the union to
deprive them of their seniority or livelihood. The Tennessee Supreme
Court held that this was, in substance, a charge of a non-violent
unfair labor practice, and that federal law and tribunals had preempted the jurisdiction of the state courts in such a matter. This
decision should be contrasted with the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Humphrey v. Moore.55 It would appear
to be basically inconsistent in rationale with Humphrey v. Moore in
that the rights in the present case are rights arising under a previous
collective agreement (subject to Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act)
and it is well-established that the enforcement of such rights can be
52. 312 F.2d at 255.

53. 316 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1963).
54. 211 Tenn. 334, 364 S.W.2d 931 (1963).

55. Humphrey v. Moore, supra note 5. Here the Court found the complaint
charged a breach of contract. "It is clear that suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization may be brought in either state or federal
courts." 375 U.S. at 345 n.6.
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maintained in a state court as well as a federal court although federal
law controls.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had to interpret a section
0
of the National Labor Relations Act in NLRB v. Strickland."
In a proceeding against a union for alleged unfair labor practices,
the Board issued subpoenas directing two union representatives to
appear and testify. They appeared, but their attorney would not
permit them to testify, contending that there was no proof of service
of the subpoenas. The General Counsel of the Board, pursuant to
section 11(2) of the Act 7 applied to the United States District Court
for an order requiring them to appear and give testimony, which
order was granted by the court. 8 The court of appeals affirmed,
treating only one of appellant's contentions at any length: that proof
of service must be made before the district court has jurisdiction
under section 11(2). The court held that this meant that proof must
be made in the district court, and not that proof must have been
made before the Board.
V. RITs oF EMPLOYFxS
Under this heading has been grouped some miscellaneous cases,
the common characteristic of which might be said to be that each
involves, in various ways, the assertion of some right by employees.
Thus, in one case,5 9 the plaintiff employee had filed charges with
the local union against its business agent for alleged discrimination
in referrals of employment. The charges were referred to the
Executive Board which dismissed them. Plaintiff tried again but this
time the membership voted not to accept them. Plaintiff then filed
a charge with the NLRB, but the Board, after investigation, declined
to issue a complaint. The local union then fined plaintiff 100 dollars
for violating the international's constitution by filing a charge with
the NLRB without first having exhausted all available remedies
within the union. Plaintiff refused to pay the fine. As a result, his
tendered dues were not accepted and his union membership suspended. The union did, however, refer plaintiff for employment.
Plaintiff then filed suit for injunctive and other relief alleging
the union had wrongfully fined and suspended him in violation of
section 101 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
("Landrum-Griffin") Act of 1959.60 The district court held that
56. 321 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1963).
57. 61 Stat. 150 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1958).
58. NLRB v. Strickland, 220 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Tenn. 1962).
59. McCraw v. United Association of Journeymen, 216 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Tenn.
1963).
60. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp. I, 1959). Relief was sought
under section 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. I, 1959).
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imposition of the fine violated section 101(a) (4), which prohibits
unions from disciplining members for instituting actions before courts
or administrative agencies. One proviso is that the member must
first exhaust reasonable hearing procedures within the union. The
court held that plaintiff's filing of charges with the union on two
occasions was a sufficient exhaustion of internal remedies. The court
concluded that the fine violated section 101(a) (4), and the refusal
to accept plaintiff's dues, suspension of his membership, and the
exclusion of him from union activities was a denial of equal rights and
a denial of freedom of speech and assembly in violation of section
101(a) (1) and (2). The court thereupon ordered that the fine be
set aside and that the union accept the tendered dues. The court,
however, refused to award damages, finding the union's violation
had resulted in no loss to plaintiff.
In Russ. v. Southern Ry., 61 plaintiff brought an action under the
Railway Labor Act 62 seeking enforcement of an award and order of
the National Railway Adjustment Board. Plaintiff, an engineer, and
one Cox, the fireman, were the engine crew on a train which was
involved in a collision with a motor car on May 8, 1958. The NRAB
found that the operator of the motor car violated several safety rules
and that this was the proximate cause of the accident. However, as
plaintiff and Cox were also violating a safety rule, they were dismissed from service on May 15, 1958. Cox was subsequently restored to service on September 27, 1958. The NRAB, in treating
plaintiff's claim for restoration to service, held that there could not
be this disparity in discipline, and ordered plaintiff restored to service
as of September 27, 1958, with back pay from that date. In opposing
the order, the carrier contended that-the Board could not substitute its
judgment for management in matters of discipline. The court, after
discussing the limited scope of review and the Board's expertise,
affirmed the order. The court, like the Board, emphasized the railroad's early reinstatement of Cox. The court apparently was moved
by the fact that the plaintiff was sixty-six years old, had worked for
the railroad thirty-six years, and had had an unblemished record until
this accident.
The plaintiff in another case arising under a different statute did
not fare so well. 63 He had been employed by the defendant company
from 1945 until 1954 when he entered military service. While he
was in the service, the company and the union entered an agreement
providing severance pay for employees laid off for lack of work. After
being released from the service on July 28, 1958, plaintiff applied
61. 218 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
62. 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1958).
63. Hire v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 324 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1963).
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for reinstatement on July 31, 1958, and was placed on the recall list
of laid-off employees in accordance with his rightful uninterrupted
seniority. Plaintiff applied for severance pay on August 18, 1958, and
the company refused his application on August 28, 1958. Plaintiff
brought an action on October 9, 1961, under section 9 of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act6 to recover the severance
pay allegedly due him. The defendant company asserted that the
action was barred by the Tennessee statute of limitations which provides in pertinent part: "civil actions based upon the alleged violation
of any federal or state statute creating monetary liability for personal
services rendered . . . shall be commenced within three (3) years
from the accruing of the cause of action." 65 The district court 6 had
held that this did not apply and that as a veteran plaintiff was
entitled to the benefits provided in the collective agreement. The
court of appeals, 67 reversing, held that severance pay was compensation for services rendered, and thus there was in the instant case,
in the statutory language, a "monetary liability for personal services
rendered"; that even though the labor agreement provided for the
severance pay, the federal act (the Universal Military Training and
Service Act) gave it vitality, and defendant's liability would not
exist except for the federal act. The court held that the action was
based upon a violation of federal law within the meaning of the
Tennessee statute of limitations, which statute, therefore, barred this
action.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was also confronted with an
interesting question on venue. 68 Plaintiffs were officials in a Nashville local of an international union. They brought an action in the
Middle District of Tennessee, under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 69 alleging that the International and District
Lodge No. 57 conspired to expel or disaffiliate plaintiff's Local 42.
They alleged that District Lodge 57, in Chattanooga, adopted a
resolution asking the International to expel Local 42, whereupon the
International, in session in Kansas City, Kansas, approved the request
and expelled Local 42.
Section 102 of the statute provides that any action against a labor
organization shall be brought in the district where the violation
64. 70 Stat. 509 (1956), 50 U.S.C. § 459 (1958).
65. TENN.CODE ANN.§ 28-305 (1956).
66. Hire v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 211 F. Supp. 164 (1962).

67. Hire v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 324 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1963).
68. Local 42, International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 324 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1963).
69. 73 Stat. 519-41 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 to 531 (Supp. I, 1959).
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occurred.70 The court was faced with the question of whether the
violation had occurred in the Eastern District of Tennessee, where the
resolution was adopted, the District of Kansas, where it was approved
and executed, or the Middle District of Tennessee, where, in a sense,
the resolution had its effect. The court, while not deciding between
the two other choices, held that the alleged violation had not occurred
in the Middle District of Tennessee; therefore, venue was not properly
laid in the district where the complaint was filed.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals was confronted with the task of
7
classifying some employees in Burns v. Temperature Control Co. 1
This was a suit by a subcontractor to recover for work done in
construction of a state mental institution in Greeneville, Tennessee.
Plaintiff also sought a declaration of his rights and those of his
employees under the Tennessee Prevailing Wage Act.72 Plaintiff had
been refused payment when the State Department of Labor determined that plaintiff failed to classify and pay his employees according
to the work they were doing. Thus, the state refused to pay the
prime contractor who refused to pay plaintiff. Subsequently, the state
paid the money due into court pending final determination of the
rights of plaintiff and his employer. The question was whether the
employees were laborers, as classified by plaintiff, or sheetmetal
workers. None of them were journeyman sheetmetal workers, but
they had training and experience in this field. The court found that
the employees assembled and hung metal duct works using tools of
the sheetmetal trade, and this was done with little or no supervision.
The court held that this constituted performing sheetmetal work.
The court recognized that the employees did manual labor in unloading and stacking the metal strips, but said this was incidental to
their primary work. The court, affirming the trial judge, held that
these employees should be classified and paid as sheetmetal workers.
70. 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. I, 1959). The section also
provides that the action may be brought where the defendant labor organization has
its principal office, but this clearly was not applicable.
71. 371 S.W.2d 804 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
72. TuNN. CODE ANN.§§ 12-406 to -424 (1956).

